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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY

,

Case No.
10752

LOVEJOY,~aTHELMA

ALLRED,

Defendant and Appellant. \

Supplemental Brief of Respondent

As a supplemental brief the respondent herewith
submits the following additional argument in support
of the judgment of the lower court and POINT IV of
its original brief.
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT
POINT IV
SECTION 32-2-1 OF THE REVISED
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY,
1

UTAH, 1965, IS A VALID EXERCISE
OF THE POLICE POWER.
Section 32-2-1 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City, Utah, 1965, provides as follows:

"It shall be unlawful for any person to:
" ( 1) Commit or off er or agree to commit a
lewd act or an act of sexual intercourse for hire
or of moral perversion.
-

"* * *

" ( 7) Direct or offer to direct any person to
any place or building for the purpose of committing any lewd act or act of sexual intercourse
for hire or of moral perversion.

"(8) Aid, abet, allow, permit or participate in
the commission of any of the acts prohibited in
subsection ( 1) through ( 7) above."
It is asserted by the appellant that Salt Lake City
has no authority to pass such an ordinance because such
acts have not been declared to be unlawful by the State
legislature and the city has not been specifically authorized to prevent such acts. Section 10-8-41, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, authorizes cities as follows:

"They may suppress or prohibit the keeping
of disorderly houses, houses of ill fame or assignation, or houses kept by, maintained for, or resorted to or used by, one or more females for
lewdness or prostitution within the limits of the
city and within three miles of the boundaries
thereof, and may prohibit resorting thereto for
any of the purposes aforesaid; * * *."
2

And Section 10-8-51, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
grants the following power to cities:
"They may provide for the punishment of***
prostitutes, * * *."
It is claimed by the appellant that the foregoing statutes
have application only to prostitution which necessarily
requires proof of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with
a plurality of men as opposed to one man. Assuming
this argument to be true, it still does not follow that the
city has no authority to enact the above cited ordinance.
Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, grants
the following broad police power to cities:

"They may pass all ordinances and rules, and
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect or discharging all
powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and
such as are necessary and proper to provide for
the safety and preserve the health, and promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and
good order, comfort and convenience of the city
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein; and may enforce obedience to such ordinances with such fines or penalties as they may deem proper, provided that the
punishment of any offense shall be by fine in any
sum less than $300 or by imprisonment not to
exceed six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment." (Emphasis added)
\Vith respect to the exercise of the police powers as set
forth in the above statute, it is stated as follows in 16
Am ..Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, § 309:
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"A cardinal principal involved in the exercise
of the police power establishes the well settled
rule that the police power may be exerted to preserve and protect the public morals. Therefore,
any practice or business the tendency of which,
as shown by experience, is to weaken or corrupt
the morals of those who follow it or to encourage
idleness instead of habits of industry is a legitimate subject for regulation or prohibition by the
state."
Andin 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations,§ 288,
it is stated:
"Municipalities may exercise police power for
preservation and protection of the public morals."
In accordance with the foregoing well established
principles, and pursuant to the power contained in Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the Utah
Supreme Court, in Ogden City v. Leo, 54 U. 556, 182
P. 530, 5 A.L.R. 960, upheld as reasonable and valid a
city ordinance prohibiting the maintenance of booths of
certain dimensions in restaurants so as to prevent persons of both sexes having no regard for law or good
morals from meeting in such places. And in Gronlund
v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284, 194 P.2d 464, this court
held that the powers granted under Section 10-8-84,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are sufficiently comprehensive to grant authority to cities to pass Sunday
closing ordinances which are otherwise valid. The same
has been held true with respect to an ordinance providing
particular means for collection and disposal of garbage,
Salt Lake City v. Bernhagen, 56 U. 159, 189 P. 583, and

4

for the inspection and regulation of the sale of milk.
Salt Lake City v. Howe, 37 U. 170, 106 P. 705, Ann.
Cas. 1912C, 189. Certainly if the prohibition involved
in the Leo case had a reasonable relationship to the preservation of the public morals, the prohibition of an act
of sexual intercourse for hire under the city ordinance
in this case would also bear a reasonable relationship to
the preservation and protection of public morals. The
appellant admits that prostitution, i.e., indiscriminate
sexual intercourse with men as opposed to a single man,
is a proper subject of legislative prohibition. Does the
second proved act of sexual intercourse for hire make
the original occurrence any more inimical to the public
interest than the original occurrence standing alone? We
think not. Every prostitute must undertake her first
act of sexual intercourse for hire as a prelude to her
becoming a "prostitute" within the definition advanced
by the appellant. It would appear elemental that any
act which has a tendency to encourage or promote "prostitution" in the legal sense is contrary to the public good
and, therefore, is subject to prohibition by a municipality in the exercise of its police powers to protect and
preserve the public morals. It would appear most unreasonable to assume that the first act of sexual intercourse for hire by a woman will not be followed by a
second, a third and perhaps a lifetime of selling human
flesh. Common experience and knowledge dictates otherwise. There is a direct relationship between an act of
sexual intercourse for hire and indiscriminate sexual
intercourse with men.
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The Supreme Court of California has long held
that a municipality, in the exercise of its police powers,
may prohibit any practice or business having a tendency
to weaken or corrupt the morals of those who follow it
or to encourage idleness instead of habits of industry.
See Ex Parte Tuttle, 91 Cal. 589, 27 P. 933, wherein
that court states as follows in upholding an ordinance
of the City and County of San Francisco prohibiting
pools and wagers on horse racing except within the
enclosure of the race track:
"Any practice or business, the tendency of
which, as shown by experience, is to weaken or
corrupt the morals of those who follow it, or to
encourage idleness instead of habits of industry,
is a legitimate subject for regulation or prohibition by the state; and that gambling, in the various modes in which it is practiced, is thus demoralizing in its tendencies, and therefore an evil
which the law might rightfully suppress without
interfering with any of those inherent rights of
citizenship which it is the object of government
to protect and secure, is no longer an open question. The measures needful or appropriate to be
taken in the exercise of this police power are
determined by legislative policy and for this purpose a wide discretion is committed to the law
making body. vVhether it shall entirely prohibit,
or only regulate by confining such practices within prescribed limits; whether the law shall apply
to every kind of gambling or only to those games
or wagers in which evil effects appear with greatest prominence - must be determined primarily
by the legislative department of the state or of
the municipality authorized to exercise this great
power, which is conferred for the purpose of
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securing the public safety and welfare; and unless it clearly appears that a statute or ordinance
ostensibly enacted for this purpose has no real
or substantial relation to these objects, and that
the fundamental rights of the citizen are assailed
under the guise of a police regulation, the action
of that department is conclusive."
We know of no fundamental right of any person
to participate in, or aid or abet the commission of, an act
of sexual intercourse for hire whether it be for the first
time or the hundredth time, and the exercise of the police
power by Salt Lake City in adopting the foregoing
ordinance is clearly valid and enforceable.
In addition to the foregoing, as pointed out in
respondent's original brief, Section 10-8-50, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, grants broad powers to cities to punish
persons disturbing the peace and good order of the city
by indecent or disorderly conduct or by lewd or lascivious behavior and to provide for punishment of such
other petty offenses as the board of commissioners may
deem proper. Certainly an act or offer of sexual intercourse for hire, even if technically insufficient to constitute the offense of prostitution, because of failure of
proof of indiscriminate sexual intercourse with men,
falls within the category of moral offenses for which
the above statute expressly authorizes cities to impose
punishment. That the commission of an act of sexual
intercourse for hire or the offer to commit such an act
is contrary to the well established standards of decency
and good order of Salt Lake City, the State of Utah
and the United States of America cannot be seriously
7

disputed. That such acts constitute lewd or lascivious
behavior would likewise appear to admit of little doubt.
The legislative body of Salt Lake City has so found and
this court should not interfere in the exercise of the
respondent's governmental powers to preserve the peace
and good order of the city for the well-being of its
inhabitants by making such acts of moral degeneracy
unlawful, thereby giving l~gal status to the atomic age
practitioners of the "oldest profession in the world."
Respect£ ully submitted,
HOMER HOLMGREN
Salt Lake City Attorney
JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney
414 City and County Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

8

